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Abstract
Iteratively reweighted least squares (IRLS) is a widely-used method in machine learning to estimate
the parameters in the generalised linear models. In particular, IRLS for L1 minimisation under the
linear model provides a closed-form solution in each step, which is a simple multiplication between the
inverse of the weighted second moment matrix and the weighted first moment vector. When dealing
with privacy sensitive data, however, developing a privacy preserving IRLS algorithm faces two
challenges. First, due to the inversion of the second moment matrix, the usual sensitivity analysis in
differential privacy incorporating a single datapoint perturbation gets complicated and often requires
unrealistic assumptions. Second, due to its iterative nature, a significant cumulative privacy loss
occurs. However, adding a high level of noise to compensate for the privacy loss hinders from getting
accurate estimates. Here, we develop a practical algorithm that overcomes these challenges and
outputs privatised and accurate IRLS solutions. In our method, we analyse the sensitivity of each
moments separately and treat the matrix inversion and multiplication as a post-processing step,
which simplifies the sensitivity analysis. Furthermore, we apply the concentrated differential privacy
formalism, a more relaxed version of differential privacy, which requires adding a significantly less
amount of noise for the same level of privacy guarantee, compared to the conventional and advanced
compositions of differentially private mechanisms.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy (DP) algorithms provide strong privacy guarantees by typically perturbing some
statistics of a given dataset, which appear in the outputs of an algorithm [1]. The amount of noise
added for the perturbation is set in order to compensate for any difference in the probability of any
outcome of an algorithm by adding a single individual’s datapoint to or removing it from the data.
So, in order to develop a DP algorithm, one first needs to analyse the maximum difference in the
probability of any outcome, which often called sensitivity, to set the level of additive noise.
In this note, we’re interested in developing a privacy preserving iteratively reweighted least squares
(IRLS) method. In the compressed sensing literature [2], IRLS is used for solving the L-1 minimi-
sation problem, in which a closed-form update of parameters in each step is available. This IRLS
solution in each step is a simple multiplication between the inverse of the weighted second moment
matrix and the weighted first moment vector. Due to the inverse of the second moment matrix,
analysing the sensitivity becomes challenging. Previous work [3] assumes each feature of each data-
point is i.i.d. drawn from a standard normal distribution, and analysed the sensitivity of the inverse
of the second moment matrix. Unfortunately, the assumption on each features being independent is
often not realistic.
Another challenge in developing a privacy preserving IRLS method comes from the iterative nature
of the IRLS algorithm. The conventional DP composition theorem (Theorem 3.16 in [1]) states that
multiple iterations of a -DP algorithm faces a linearly degrading privacy, which yields J-DP after
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J iterations. A more advanced composition theorem (Theorem 3.20 in [1]) yields (
√
2J log(1/δ)+
J(e − 1), δ)-DP. The new variable δ (stating the mechanism’s failure probability) that needs to be
set to a very small value, which makes the cumulative privacy loss still relatively high. To compensate
for the privacy loss, one needs to add a significant amount of noise to the IRLS solution to avoid
revealing any individual information from the output of the algorithm.
In this note, we tackle these challenges by : (1) we analyse the sensitivity of the weighted second
moment matrix and the weighted first moment vector separately and perturb each moment by adding
noise consistent with its own sensitivity. Then, we do the multiplication of the inverse of perturbed
second moment matrix and the perturbed first moment vector. This inversion and multiplication
can be viewed as a post-processing step, which doesn’t alter the privacy level. Since we perturb
each moment separately, this method does not require any restrictive assumptions on the data. In
addition, the noise variance naturally scales with the amount of data. (2) we apply the concentrated
differential privacy formalism, a more relaxed version of differential privacy, to obtain more accurate
estimates for the same cumulative privacy loss, compared to DP and its (, δ)-relaxation. In the
following, we start by describing our privacy preserving IRLS algorithm.
2 Privacy preserving IRLS
Given a dataset which consists of N input-output pairs {xi, yi}Ni=1 where we assume ||xi||2 ≤ 1 and
||yi|| ≤ 1. The iteratively reweighted least squares solution has the form:
θˆ
(t)
irls = (X
>SX)−1X>Sy := B−1A (1)
where X ∈ RN×d is a design matrix in which the ith row is the transposed ith input x> (of length
d), and y is a column vector of outputs. We denote B = 1NX
>SX, and A = 1NX
>Sy. Here S is
a diagonal matrix with diagonal s = |y − Xθˆ(t−1)|p−2. Here we set p = 1 and compute L1 norm
constrained least squares. To avoid dividing by 0, we set
si =
1
max(1/δ, |yi −Xiθˆ(t−1)|)
, (2)
where Xi is the ith row. δ sets the sparsity (number of non-zero values) of the IRLS solution.
We will perturb each of these statistics A and B by certain amounts, such that each statistic is
′−differentially private in each iteration.
′-differentially private moment A by Laplace mechanism. For perturbing A, we use the
Laplace mechanism. To use the Laplace mechanism, we first need to analyse the following L1-
sensitivity:
∆A := max
D,D˜∈N|χ|, ||D−D˜||1=1
|| 1NX>Sy − 1N X˜>S˜y˜||1 = maxxk,x˜k ||
1
N
xkskyk
> − 1
N
x˜ks˜ky˜k
>||1,
≤ 1
N
d∑
l=1
|xk,lskyk|+ 1
N
d∑
l=1
|x˜k,ls˜ky˜k|, triangle inequality
≤ sk
N
d∑
l=1
|xk,l|+ s˜k
N
d∑
l=1
|x˜k,l|, since |yk′ | ≤ 1 and |y˜k| ≤ 1,
≤ 2δ
√
d
N
, since sk ≤ δ and |xl|1 ≤
√
d. (3)
2
Hence, the following Laplace mechanism produces ′-differentially private moment of A:
A˜ = A+ (Y1, · · · , Yd), (4)
where Yi ∼i.i.d. Laplace(2δ
√
d
N′ ).
′-differentially private moment A by Gaussian mechanism. One could perturb the first
moment by using the Gaussian mechanism. To use the Gaussian mechanism, one needs to analyse
the L2-sensitivity, which is ∆2A = 2δ/N straightforwardly coming from Eq.(3)
A˜ = A+ (Y1, · · · , Yd), (5)
where Yi ∼i.i.d. Gaussian(0, σ2), where σ ≥ c∆2A/′ for c2 ≥ 2 log(1.25/δ).
′-differentially private moment B. We perturb B by adding Wishart noise following [4], which
provides strong privacy guarantees and significantly higher utility than other methods (e.g., [5–7])
as illustrated in [4] when perturbing positive definite matrices.
To draw Wishart noise, we first draw Gaussian random variables:
zi ∼ N
(
0,
δ
2′N
Id
)
, for i = {1, · · · , d+ 1}, (6)
and construct a matrix Z := [z1, · · · , zd+1] ∈ Rd×(d+1)
B˜ := B + ZZ> (7)
then B˜ is a ′-differentially private second moment matrix. Proof follows the paper [4]. The matrix
ZZ> is a sample from a Wishart distribution W(ZZ>| δ2′N Id, d+ 1). The probability ratio between
a noised-up version B˜ given a dataset D (where B is the exact second moment matrix given D) and
given a neighbouring dataset D′ (where B′ is the exact second moment matrix given D′) is given by
W(B˜ −B| δ2′N Id, d+ 1)
W(B˜ −B′| δ2′N Id, d+ 1)
=
exp(− ′Nδ tr(B˜ −B))
exp(− ′Nδ tr(B˜ −B′))
, (8)
= exp(
′N
δ
tr(B −B′)), (9)
= exp(
′N
δ
1
N
tr(skxkxk
> − s˜kx˜kx˜k>)), (10)
= exp(
′
δ
(skxk
>xk − s˜kx˜k>x˜k)), (11)
≤ exp(′), since 0 ≤ xk>xk ≤ 1, and 0 ≤ sk ≤ δ.
3 Concentrated differential privacy for IRLS
Here we adopt a relaxed version of DP, the so-called concentrated differential privacy (CDP) in
order to significantly lower the amounts of noise to add to the moments without compromising on
cumulative privacy loss over several iterations.
According to Theorem 3.5 in [8], any -DP algorithm is ((exp() − 1)/2, )-CDP. Furthermore,
theorem 3.4 states that J-composition of (µ, τ)-CDP mechanism guarantees (
∑J
i=1 µi,
√∑J
i=1 τ
2
i )-
CDP. Suppose we perturb some key statistic in each IRLS iteration using the Laplace mechanism.
3
Denote the difference in statistic given dataset x and y by ∆S := S(x) − S(y). The conventional
composition theorem says that I should add Lap(∆SJ/) in each iteration to ensure -DP after J
iterations. Now suppose we perturb the key statistic in each iteration by adding Laplace noise drawn
from Lap(∆S/′), which, according to Theorem 3.5 in [8], gives us a (′(exp(′) − 1)/2, ′)-CDP
solution. According to Theorem 3.4 in [8], after J iterations, we obtain a (J′(exp(′)− 1)/2,√J′)-
CDP solution. What we want to make sure is if the expected privacy loss is equal to our privacy
budget , i.e., J′(exp(′)− 1)/2 = . Using Taylor’s expansion, we can rewrite the left hand side by
J′(1 + ′ +
∑∞
j=2
′j
j! − 1)/2 = , which we can lower bound by ignoring the infinite sum, J′2/2 ≤ .
Hence, the largest ′ should be less than equal to
√
2/J .
This says, in each iteration, the key statistic should be perturbed by adding Laplace noise drawn
from Lap(
√
J∆S/
√
2), in order to obtain a (,
√
2)-CDP solution after J iterations. In the IRLS
algorithm, we have two statistics to perturb in each iteration. Suppose we perturb each statistic to
ensure ′-DP. Then, we can modify the result above by replacing J with 2J for the IRLS algorithm.
Hence, each perturbation should result in ′-DP parameter, where ′ :=
√
2
2J =
√

J . This gives us
the -CDP IRLS algorithm below.
Algorithm 1 (,
√
2)-CDP IRLS algorithm via moment perturbation
Require: Dataset D
Ensure: -IRDP least squares solution after J-iteration
(1) Compute A = 1NX
>y and add either Laplace or Gaussian noise by Eq.(4) or Eq.(5)
(2) Compute B = 1NX
>X and add Wishart noise by Eq.(7)
(3) Compute the -CDP least squares solution by θcdpirls := B˜
−1A˜.
4 Experiments
Our simulated dataset consists of N datatpoints, each with d dimensional covariates, generated
using i.i.d. draws xi ∼ N (0, Id), then normalise X such that the largest squared L2 norm is 1.
We generated the true parameter θ ∈ Rd from N (0, Id). We generated each observation yi from
N (Xθ, σ2I), where σ2 = 0.01. We also normalised Y such that the largest squared L2-norm is 1.
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Figure 1: We tested (,
√
2)-CDP-IRLS
(gau: Gaussian mechanism for mean per-
turbation, lap: Laplace mechanism for
mean perturbation), -DP-IRLS (using the
conventional composition theorem), and
(, δ)-DP-IRLS (using the Advanced com-
position theorem) for d = 10 and  = 0.9
with varying N for which we generated 20
independent datasets. For each IRLS solu-
tion, we computed the log-likelihood of test
data (10% of training data), then divided
by the number of test points to show the
log-likelihood per test point. CDP-IRLS re-
quires significantly less data than DP-IRLS
for the same level of expected privacy.
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